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Theory offers a number of plausible benefits from international financial 
liberalisation (IFL). These include
1: a) static resource allocation gains through 
international specialisation in the production of financial services; b) static financial 
gains through appropriate portfolio diversification internationally; c) dynamic or x-
efficiency gains through the introduction of competition in the financial sector; d) 
gains from intertemporal trade through access to global financial markets; e) absence 
of rent-seeking and other costs of capital restraints; and f) imposition of market 
discipline on policy makers by ensuring that profligate policies, such as unsustainable 
external and fiscal imbalances and debt accumulation, trigger capital outflows and 
balance of payments/currency crises
2. However, a careful examination of available 




2.   Defining IFL  
  An important reason for the lack of robust nexus between IFL and economic 
growth may be the fact that the definition of IFL is far from apparent. Indeed, many 
studies on the issue have failed to make a clear distinction between “capital account 
deregulation”, on the one hand, and “internationalisation of the financial sector”, on 
the other. The latter is broadly defined as the elimination of barriers to entry and 
discriminatory treatment of foreign competition and cross-border provision of 
financial services.  
  The nexus between international capital flows and financial services may be 




hand corner refers to the case of financial autarky, i.e. neither financial services trade 
nor an open capital account. Cell IV on the bottom right-hand side denotes the case of 
“complete” IFL, i.e. liberal capital account and bank internationalisation. The 
remaining two cells may be broadly classified as “partial IFL”. Specifically, Cell II 
involves the case of bank internationalisation with capital restrictions; while Cell III is 
the case of capital account deregulation but with restrictions on trade in banking 
services maintained. Of course, in reality, matters are not nearly as simple; the two 
elements of IFL are closely intertwined and cannot be cleanly separated. Nonetheless, 
the assumption of total separability is useful conceptually. 
While the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) recognises the 
right of countries to maintain sovereignty over prudential and related regulations of all 
financial firms resident in the country, studies suggest that the introduction of foreign 
banks into developing countries will create domestic pressure for local banking 
authorities in the host countries to enhance and eventually harmonise regulatory and 
supervisory procedures and standards to international levels, particularly with regard 
to risk management practices
4. Moreover, if the banking system has a more 
internationally diversified asset base it may be less prone to instability and financial 
crises
5. There are yet other potential advantages of allowing foreign bank entry - such 
as lowering overall financial costs structures - which may make it a desirable policy in 
and of itself
6. There is a growing body of literature emphasising a direct relationship 
between the extent of IFL (loosely proxied by measures of foreign participation in the 
banking sector) and various measures of efficiency
7. 
This said, care must be taken to ensure that foreign competition is introduced 
gradually in order to avoid disrupting the domestic financial system by enticing 




redemption”). Without this, an increase in bad loans due to risky investments could 
offset the efficiency gains associated with greater international competition
8. More 
generally, many of the suggested advantages of financial sector and capital account 
liberalisation are heavily contingent on the assumption that the deregulation takes 
place in a well-sequenced and timed manner
9. Failure to do so could lead to 
calamitous repercussions on the domestic financial system and the overall 
macroeconomy. As Willett and Dillon note
10: 
(F)or markets to operate well they need considerable infrastructure that 
must be provided by the state, but state involvement has often been 
perverse. The issue is how states and markets can best complement. 
Market critics need to recognise that most of the recent currency and 
financial instability has been caused less by any inherent instability of 
financial markets than by financial markets reacting to perverse 
economic incentives generated by governments. Likewise market 
enthusiasts need to recognise that in the absence of an appropriate 
infrastructure of law and institutions, markets are unlikely to work well 
and where perverse economic incentives are in place that liberalisation 
can sometimes do more harm than good (p.27). 
 
Echoing this point, Eichengreen notes
11: 
 
Capital account liberalisation can be counterproductive, to be sure, if it 
takes place before sever policy-related distortions have been removed 
and before domestic markets, institutions, and the administrative 
capacity of the prudential authorities have developed to the point 
where one can be confident that foreign finance will be channelled in 
productive directions. This qualification may be too frequently 
neglected, as the unconditional advocacy of capital account 
liberalisation heard in the mid-1990s and the Asian crisis that quickly 
followed remind us to our chagrin (p.31). 
 
 
3.  Defining Capital Account Deregulation and Components of Capital Flows 
3.1  Finding Suitable Proxies 
Even in cases where studies limit their focus to capital account deregulation, 
the measures they often use to proxy capital account openness are certainly not 
without their difficulties. Such studies may be broadly divided into two groups. The 




data from the Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions annual), while the 
other set has focused on de facto restrictions by examining the extent of stock market 
integration, degree of market capitalisation, magnitude of capital flows, on-shore and 
off-shore interest differentials. In his recent review of capital account liberalisation, 
Eichengreen discusses the limitations of all these measures of capital account 
liberalisation and concludes
12: 
Empiricists need to better distinguish between different kinds of 
controls…They need to develop more informative measures of those 
aspects of the legal, contracting and information environments that 
plausibly shape the effects of capital account liberalisation. They need 
to construct better indicators of the other policy initiatives with which 
capital account liberalisation is sequenced (p.32).    
 
 
3.2   Components of Capital Flows 
Another important reason why studies on IFL (or capital account deregulation 
more narrowly) have failed to unearth robust evidence on its growth effects on a 
systematic basis is that capital account transactions consist of a number of sub-
components ranging from foreign direct investment (FDI), which is seen as being 
relatively stable, on the one hand, to “mobile capital” or “hot money” (portfolio and 
short-term debt flows), on the other. According to received wisdom, inflows and 
sudden reversals in mobile capital are the reason for the recent financial crises in 
emerging economies (dubbed “capital account crises”). There do exist models that 
conveniently explain the volatility of short-term capital flows, covering both bank 
lending and portfolio flows. However, the essence of these models is that a relatively 
small initial loss of confidence can quickly translate into panic and a mass exodus of 
funds, especially when international reserves fall below a threshold where they 
become insufficient to cover short-term liabilities




it is these short-term flows that are highly liquid and mobile and therefore make a 
country susceptible to crisis. 
Thus, during the Mexican currency crisis of 1994-95, the sharp outflows were 
primarily due to portfolio flows, while in the case of the East Asian crisis of 1997-98, 
the outflows were primarily due to reversals of short-term bank flows. To be sure, 
balance of payments data from the IMF reveal that the Asia-5 economies (viz. 
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines) experienced pointed 
reversals in net private capital flows of about $100 billion between 1996 and 1998. 
This reversal was largely due to the “other net investment” category which primarily 
consists of short term bank lending. The entire $85 billion of inflows into the Asia-5 
economies of this category in 1995 and 1996 were lost in the next three years as 
international banks became unwilling to roll over existing short term debts to the 
region, let alone extend new ones (Table 2). In contrast, FDI is often determined by 
long-term fundamental economic characteristics which are more stable and relatively 
irreversible in the short run. Since FDI enhances the productive capacity of the host 
country, it produces the revenue stream necessary to cover future capital outflows
14. 
There is a fairly large body of empirical studies which finds FDI to have been the 
most resilient form of external financing
15. Empirical analysis suggests that emerging 
economies which are most prone to currency crashes tend to have a relatively smaller 
share of FDI in total capital inflows and a relatively higher share of short-term 
external debt
16.  
The foregoing has been the basis for the conventional wisdom that switching 
from short-term to long-term capital flows may reduce the probability of currency 
crises. However, recent empirical investigations into the causes of currency crises in 




FDI and the probability of currency crisis. One potential criticism of the conventional 
view regarding differing degrees of stability of various capital flows is that it fails to 
take account of the complex interactions between FDI and other flows
17. Examining 
each flow individually, particularly during short periods of time (such as year-to-year 
variations), may at best be an unreliable indicator of the degree of risk of various 
classes of flows, and at worst could be highly misleading. Capital that flows in as FDI 
may well flow out under another guise. On these grounds, we should expect FDI and 
portfolio flows to be positively related. The nature of the relationship between FDI 
and other capital flows is, therefore, an empirical issue. 
  Between the two forms of mobile capital, i.e. portfolio and short-term debt, the 
latter is arguably of greater concern as a source of vulnerability. This is so as there 
can only be quantity adjustments in the case of debt flows unlike portfolio flows 
where volume adjustments may not necessarily have to be as large, as part of the 
brunt can be borne by variations in resale prices or valuation. Thus, Baily et al. note 
that “bank loans are mostly illiquid, fixed-price assets…because the ‘price’ of a loan – 
the interest rate – does not – automatically adjust to changing market conditions, 
banks adjust the quantity of lending instead” (p. 103)
18.  
In view of the preceding, it is not surprising that the extent of short-term 
indebtedness has been found to be a key indicator of illiquidity and a robust predictor 
of financial crises
19. The extreme reversibility of short-term debt in the event of a 
negative shock exposes borrowers to liquidity runs and systemic crises. In a 
somewhat contrarian view, Jeanne argues that it is not clear that short-term debt 
contracts ought to be discouraged as they may play a socially advantageous function 
in reducing agency problems
20. In addition, there is an issue of causality; it is 




vice versa. Nonetheless, the mainstream view is that short-term debt is a potential 
source of destabilisation. The IMF appears to have embraced this position as well
21.  
Another reason why short-term debt is seen as a particularly acute source of 
vulnerability is that reversals in this component could give rise to currency or 
maturity mismatches. The latter is a source of vulnerability for all kinds of unhedged 
external debt including long-term debt (either borrowing via financial institutions or 
bonds). To the extent that a relatively larger proportion of a country’s liabilities is 
denominated in foreign currency vis-à-vis its assets (so-called “liability 
dollarisation”), a currency devaluation could lead to sharp declines in the country’s 
net worth with calamitous effects on the financial and real sectors (so-called “balance 
sheet” effects). 
 
4.  Tackling the Problem of “Excessive” External Indebtedness  
In view of the above-noted concerns regarding short term indebtedness, a 
strong case can be made for the setting of prudential limits on the amount of short-
term debt that a country can accumulate
22. If such regulations are imposed, it is 
imperative that they be comprehensive. They cannot merely be limited to financial 
institutions, for instance, as this could lead to accumulation of such debts by quasi-
financial institutions as well as corporates. Indeed, in the case of Indonesia, most of 
the external debt was amassed not by banks but by corporations
23. As such, 
accumulation of offshore foreign currency liabilities by the non-financial corporate 
sector must also be restricted. 
Another suggestion has been to permit relatively greater exchange rate 
flexibility. The argument here is that the more flexible the exchange rate regime the 




risk management techniques (i.e. buy necessary forex cover) in response to the higher 
element of exchange rate risk, while simultaneously reducing the extent of moral 
hazard which could lead to “excessive” unhedged external borrowing (referred to as a  
“fixed exchange rate bubble”). The introduction of these transactions costs, exchange 
rate risks and consequent removal of implicit exchange rate guarantees may also help 
moderate the extent of capital inflows, hence dampening the intensity of boom and 
bust cycles.  
Somewhat less clear is what steps need to be taken to reduce vulnerability due 
to uncovered long-term foreign currency borrowing. There are two closely related 
questions. One, why are emerging economies unable to borrow overseas in their own 
currencies (so called “original sin” phenomenon)?
24. Of course, there is always a price 
at which lenders will be willing to lend in a foreign currency, i.e. at an interest 
premium
25. Insofar as the premium that is generated in emerging market interest rates 
reflects currency and country risk perceptions, a closely related question then is why 
are domestic borrowers (in the emerging economy) unwilling to pay that premium and 
instead choose to borrow in foreign currency despite the inherent riskiness of these 
actions?  
There are at least two possible reasons. One, there could be an asymmetry in 
the risk perception of the domestic agents (potential borrowers) and foreign creditors, 
with the former’s risk perceptions being less than the latter’s. If this is the case, the 
only willing borrowers at the high interest rate will be those least likely to repay the 
loans. This adverse selection problem in turn raises the risk premium levied by 
foreign lenders, leading to the extreme case of drying up of liquidity in that market. 
Two, if domestic agents in the emerging economy are concerned about the possibility 




their ability to repay the high interest, on the one hand, and if there are nontrivial costs 
of defaulting interest payments during downturns, on the other, rational cost-benefit 
calculus may lead domestic agents to opt for “cheaper” foreign currency borrowing
26.  
In view of the fact that long term borrowing, like short term debt, involves a 
negative externality to the entire economy, short of placing outright restrictions on the   
magnitude of long-term foreign currency debt that can be accumulated, how might a 
country overcome the original sin phenomenon? Returning to the reason for the risk 
premium required to induce foreign creditors to hold the emerging economy’s 
currency at the margin, while part of country risk premium has to do with concerns 
about creditworthiness of the country (i.e. risk of non-payment), part of the currency 
risk premium has to do with the lack of credibility of the monetary authorities.  
The country risk premium could possibly be reduced if the government or 
international agencies (such as the World Bank) act as guarantors for at least a portion 
of the country’s debt, though this could lead to concerns about moral hazard. With 
regard to the currency risk premium, the concern about investing in the country’s 
currency is that there is the possibility that the monetary authority may 
opportunistically inflate/devalue. Thus, the argument has recently been made that a 
precondition for foreigners to be willing to hold the emerging economy’s assets is that 
it be widely held by domestic agents. The rationale is that with a wide holding of the 
domestic assets by domestic residents, it is much less likely that the government will 
be tempted to erode the real value of the debt
27. In this regard, steps ought to be taken 
to build up domestic bond markets. This might be achieved by the governments 
issuing domestic bonds, for instance. The creation of a robust government bond 
market would also allow for the establishment of a benchmark yield thus facilitating 
the development of markets for corporate bonds




institutions like the World Bank or regional banks like the Asian Development Bank 
ought to consciously borrow in the emerging market currency to create confidence 
among other creditors in the currency. 
One form of financial safeguard that has been increasingly used by crisis-
affected countries in Asia has been the imposition of quantitative restrictions on 
foreign currency flows; Thailand and Indonesia are examples in this regard
29. The 
IMF has been fairly supportive of such unilateral actions to restrain international 
financial flows. For instance, a recent IMF study has concluded that measures to limit 
the offshore trading of currencies “could be effective if they were comprehensive and 
effectively enforced, and were accompanied by consistent macroeconomic policies 
and structural reforms.”
30 While there may be some rationale for this, it is important 
to note that such types of restrictions that effectively reduce the degree of 
internationalisation of currencies and therefore the ability as well as willingness of 
non-residents to hold the currency, could aggravate the original sin problem that 
plagues many developing countries.   
Such potential conflicts and tradeoffs make the job of an economic 
policymaker in this era of intensified cross-border capital flows particularly 














Loan provided by foreign 
supplier 
Loan involves domestic capital 
only 
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nor international capital flows 
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Financial services trade only 
Loan involves international 
capital only 
Cell III: 
International capital flows only  
Cell IV: 
Financial services trade and 
international capital flows 
   
Source: M. Kono and L. Schuknecht (1999). “Financial Services Trade, Capital Flows, and Financial 




Net Capital Flows to Emerging East Asian Economies, 1992-2001 
























Private Capital Flows 
   Direct investment 
   Portfolio Investment 























































































Private Capital Flows 
   Direct investment 
   Portfolio Investment 



























































































Other Asian Emerging 
Economies: 
Private Capital Flows 
   Direct investment 
   Portfolio Investment 

































































































Notes:  a) Minus sign denotes a rise and vice versa 
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